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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the Msc in Energy Law, Business, 
Regulation and Policy, at International Hellenic University and deals with the complex 
issue of state aid in the energy sector. More specifically, in recent years the need for 
measures to protect the environment, necessitated the intervention of the state in the 
energy sector variously. Special attention in order to meet the European Union its 
global requirements has been given to the production of electricity from renewable 
energy, for which the state aids are particularly important due to the large production 
costs. A whole legislative system have been configured by Member States around 
the support schemes for the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources, 
which at the same time attempt to keep up with the primary objective of the European 
Union, namely the integration of the common market. The FIT schemes are not only 
the most widespread national support schemes but also have been particularly 
addressed by the European Court mainly after 2001 and the landmark ruling of 
PreussenElektra. However, even after several years the European Court insists on 
maintaining the confusing results of PreussenElektra, forming a retrograde approach 
regarding the FIT schemes and other support mechanisms in conjunction with article 
107 (1) TFEU. Comparing PreussenElektra with Vent de Colère, considered by the 
ECJ recently, will be given the answer to the fundamental question of whether and to 
what extent there were developments in the way that the case law approaches the 
FIT schemes in relation with art. 107(1) TFEU and why their design (based on 
PreussenElektra) deviated from the completion of the internal market. All that 
remains is to examine whether the new Guidelines could be the solution to the 
problems created by PreussenElektra. 
I would like to thank my supervisor Pr.Dr. Antonis Metaxas who, with his specialized 
and academic knowledge in the field of Energy, as well as the EU Competition Law 
and EU State Aid Law, inspired me from the very first contact of his lectures to deal 
with the complex issue of state aid in the energy sector. I wish also to acknowledge 
my supervisor not only for his contribution and his guidance, but also for helping me 
to understand the significance of the critical thinking. 
 
Keywords: renewable energy, green electricity, FIT-schemes, State Aid, Internal 
Market, New Guidelines. 
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Preface 
I couldn’t imagine that the law of State Aid both hides great interest and different 
aspects for study. The recent developments in the energy sector mainly with the new 
European Guidelines, sparked my interest for further study on the issue. The 
aforementioned Guidelines has also been involved with the compatibility of state aid 
to the renewable energy and promoting the harmonization of national support 
schemes for the production of green power. Precisely for this reason I wanted to deal 
with the case law and its evolution on the subject of state aid in conjunction with the 
promotion of the production of electricity from renewable energy sources for the 
completion of my studies and the acquisition of the degree Msc in “Energy Law, 
Business, Regulation and Policy” from the International Hellenic University. I hope 
this thesis can be useful and to shed light into the complex issue of State Aid in the 
energy sector and specifically in the approach of the issue of FIT support schemes in 
relation with art.107 par.1 TFEU by the European Court of Justice 
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Introduction 
 
The oil crisis during the 1970s and the major events that followed, coupled with the 
environmental pollution, created a favorable regime for the development of 
renewable energy resources. It is not a coincidence that now the generation of 
electricity from renewable energy constitutes a great part of the national policy of the 
most of the states1, because it is not only environmental friendly but also is the 
solution in the problems of energy security and global warming. However, the 
production of electricity from renewable energy sources is quite expensive compared 
with conventional energy sources2 and the public support for the green producers is 
important in order to be more competitive in the energy market. This intervention, in 
the field of Europe, usually bear the form of state aid and so must be compatible with 
the internal market as defined in Article 107(1) TFEU. Such a favorable system for 
green electricity applied in Germany3, which has created a FIT support scheme4 that 
has been declared by the Court as legitimate under the rules of state aid law. 
Although the ruling adopted in this case (PreussenElektra) was a milestone in the 
design of similar support schemes for the production of green electricity, has created 
several problems to be addressed in the following chapters.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1Abolhosseini, Almas, Heshmati, Shahrouz (2014). The Main Support Mechanisms to Finance 
Renewable Energy Development. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, [online] Vol. 40(8182), 
p.2-5. 
2Canton, J. & Linden, J. (2010).Support schemes for renewable electricity in the EU, European 
Economy. Economic Papers 408, March, p.5.  
3Bronckers, M. & van der Vlies, R. (2001). The European Court’s PreussenElektra Judgment: Tension 
between E.U. Principles and National Renewable Initiatives. European Competition Law Review, 
[online] Vol. 22(10), p.265. 
4In this thesis the support scheme will be used extensively and refers to the support mechanism used 
for the promotion of electricity generated from renewable energy sources, as defined in Directive 
2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources and amending and repealing Directive 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC. OJ 
L-140, art. 2. 
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CHAPTER I. The legal framework of the renewable energy in 
Europe 
 
The legislation for the development of renewable energy5 was affiliated with the key 
objectives of the European Union and especially with this for the promotion of the 
sustainable development6. One of the major examples is the article 11 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or Treaty) [ex article 6 TEC], in 
which the need for the integration of environmental requirements in European policy, 
has as adjunct goal the increase of sustainable development. As far as the ex-article 
174 TEC [now article 191 TFEU] is concerned, where only referred that ‘prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources’ was needed for the protection of the 
environment, no specific policy hadn’t been adopted on renewable energy in contrast 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, which in the art. 194 TFEU, integrated the policy of 
renewable energy7:  
“In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy 
shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of   
new and renewable forms of energy; and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy network.” 
 
1.1. The evolution of renewable energy legislation in Europe 
The renewable energy legislation was deployed mainly by Green Papers and 
White Papers, in which mentioned either the EU energy policy in general or 
more specifically the purposes of the renewable energy policy. In 1995 the 
                                                          
5The definition of renewable energy is set in the Directive 2009/28/EC (The Renewable Energy 
Directive). 
6Jacobsson S., Bergek A., Finon D., Lauber V., Mitchell C., Toke D., Verbruggen A. (2009). EU 
renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts?  Energy Policy, [online] Vol. 37(6), p. 2145-2146. 
7Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Article 194, Official 
Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0134 – 0134. 
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Commission published a White Paper titled8: ‘An Energy Policy for the European 
Union’, with the aim to promote the increase of renewable research and 
programs9 and the next year (1996) continued with a Green Paper on renewable 
energy, proposing the target of 12% use of renewable energy by 201010 in the 
final consumption of energy in Europe11. This target, not only was endorsed in 
1997 by the Council in its Resolution for renewable sources of energy12  but also 
outlined in the Commissions White Paper of 1997 titled: ‘Energy for the Future: 
Renewable Sources of Energy’13 and eventually adopted in the Directive 
2001/77/EC for the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in the internal electricity market (Renewable Electricity Directive)14. For 
the first time, the Directive set indicative targets for each Member State in order 
to increase the share of renewable to 12% by 2010 for the final consumption of 
energy and created incentives for the promotion of national support schemes for 
the renewable energy. According to art. 4 of the Directive: ‘Without prejudice to 
article 107 and 108 TFEU [ex articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty] the Commission 
shall evaluate the application of mechanisms used in Member States according 
to which a producer of electricity, on the basis of regulations issued by the public 
authorities, receives direct or indirect support, on the basis that these contribute 
to the objectives set out in article 11 and 191 TFEU [ex articles 6 and 174 of the 
Treaty]’ and according to this adjustment was recognized the necessity for the 
development of renewable energy in the context of state, giving  the freedom to 
the Member States to establish national support projects, which have to be 
compatible to the primary rules of the internal market, like the art. 107 TFEU, in 
order to exploit their own resources and especially their renewable energy 
sources.  
                                                          
8Fouquet, D. & Johansson, T.B. (2008). European renewable energy policy at crossroads-Focus on 
electricity support mechanism.  Energy Policy, [online], vol. 36(2008), pp.4080-4082. 
9Communication from the Commission - Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy - White 
Paper for a Community strategy and action plan. COM (95) 682 final. 
10Haas, R. (2011).A historical review of promotion strategies for electricity from renewable energy 
sources in EU countries. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, [online], vol.15(2011) pp. 1003-
1005. 
11Communication from the Commission - Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy – Green 
paper for a Community Strategy. COM (96) 576 final, p. 4. 
12Council Resolution of 27 June 1997 on renewable sources of energy (97/C 210/01). 
13Communication from the Commission - Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy - White 
Paper for a Community strategy and action plan. COM (97)599 final. 
14Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market. OJ L-
283 and supra note 10 same pages. 
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1.2. The necessity of harmonization of national support schemes  
As the climate change has started to affect significantly the global community 
and the dependence of the European Union by imports of natural gas was 
increased, the necessity for more stringent targets was obvious15. The first 
Strategic EU Energy Review was adopted in 2007 by the Commission named: 
‘An Energy Policy for Europe’16. The progress however of the spread of 
renewable energy sources faced difficulties17, so the European Commission in 
its review identified the problem: ‘The main reason for the failure to reach the 
agreed targets for renewable energy –besides the higher cost of renewable 
energy sources today compared to “traditional energy sources – is the lack of 
coherent and effective policy framework throughout the EU and a stable long 
term vision’18. Following the findings of the European Commission, the need for 
harmonization of support schemes was necessary19, according with its report in 
2008. Finally in 2009 the new Directive was adopted by Commission changed 
the EU policy and characterized by innovations for the promotion of the 
renewable energy with legally binding targets, in comparison with the previous 
Directive, and guidance for cooperation between the Member States with the 
aim to give a solution to the problem of the harmonization. Firstly, established 
the target of 20% for the renewable by 202020 and secondly in article 3 of the 
Directive it is stated that: ‘Member states shall introduce measures effectively 
designed to ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources equals or 
exceeds that shown in the indicative trajectory […]’ and this is means that 
Member States can adopted National Action Plans for their own renewable 
energy resources in order to succeed in their targets of the Directive21. However, 
contradictory is the fact that, on the one hand was pointed out that while there is 
                                                          
15Jones C. (Ed.) (2010). EU Energy Law – Volume III: Renewable Energy Law and Policy in the 
European Union. Claeys & Casteels., p. 15. 
16Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament – An 
energy policy for Europe. COM (2007) 1 final. 
17Kitzing L., Mitchell C. and Morthorst P.E. (2012). Renewable energy policies in Europe: Converging or 
diverging? Energy Policy, [online] Vol.51 (2012), pp. 196-199. 
18Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament – An 
energy policy for Europe. COM (2007) 1 final, p. 13. 
19Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament – The Renewable 
Energy Progress Report: Commission Report in accordance with Article 43 of Directive 2001/77/EC, 
Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/30/EC and on the implementation of the EU Biomass Action Plan, 
Com(2005)628. COM (2009) 192. 
20Lauber V. (2011).The European Experience with Renewable Energy Support Schemes and Their 
Adoption: Potential Lessons for Other Countries. The Journal of Renewable Energy Law and Policy 
Review, [online] Vol. 2011(2), pp. 125-126. 
21Jonker, W. & Vedder, H.H.B (2010). Het Europeesrechtelijk kader voor financiële instrumenten ter 
stimulering van energietransitie.In: Krot, B. & Smorenburg-van Middelkoop, L. Duurzame Energie–
Juridische kansen en belemmeringen.Groningen:Europa Law Publishing, [online] p.36. 
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a strong effort to promote the cooperation between the Member States in order 
to accomplish a compliance of their targets, as indicated in art. 6 & 7(1) of 
Directive22, on the other hand according to art. 2, in which the definition for the 
support schemes provided: ‘Support scheme means any instrument, scheme or 
mechanism applied by a Member State or a group of Member States, that 
promotes the use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of that 
energy, increasing the price at which it can be sold, or increasing, by means of a 
renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the volume of such energy 
purchased. This includes, but is not restricted to, investment aid, tax exemptions 
or reductions, tax refunds, renewable energy obligation support schemes 
including those using green certificates, and direct price support schemes 
including feed-in tariffs and premium payments’23, the freedom of Member 
States to determine their national supports schemes was maintained and this 
practice creates concerns in relation to the EU single market, because once 
again the harmonization of the national support schemes was not in the focal 
point. 
CHAPTER II. The notion of state aid 
 
In the previous chapter, were analyzed the evolution of the legislative framework for 
the promotion and the development of renewable energy and in particular of RES-E 
support schemes. Continuing, it will be obvious how the case law of FIT support 
schemes in conjunction with the Directives, hinder the integration of the internal 
market, but first, the legislative framework of the national support schemes of the 
Member States for green electricity, should be compatible with the rules and the 
criteria of State Aid and so the concept of state aid is important to be analyzed in this 
next chapter. 
2.1.The EU State aid law and the renewable energy 
The creation of an internal market and its proper functioning is one of the main 
objectives of European Union. The definition of the internal market is 
                                                          
22Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and repealing Directive 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC. OJ L-140, art. 6 & 7. 
23Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and repealing Directive 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC. OJ L-140, art. 2. 
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established in Article 26 (2)24: ‘The internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured […]’, and this is why most of the sectors, between them 
and the energy sector, have liberalized. But except the idea of the creation of a 
single market there is a policy for the sustainable development, in which the 
financial support and the incentives for the renewable energy sources, comes 
into a conflict with the internal market.  This contrast is more obvious in art 194 
TFEU: ‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union 
policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States […]25, 
in which on the one side there is the necessity not only for the preservation of 
the environment but also for its improvement and on the other side this effort 
have to be supported by the Member State with respect to the rules of the 
internal market. All the above are related with the support of green electricity, 
because the national support schemes for its promotion, most of the times may 
be the reason for the violation of the rules of state aid26 and hence the rules of 
the single market. 
2.2. The criteria of article 107(1) TFEU.  
Checking for the compatibility of State aids with the internal market of the 
European Union is very important because it aims to ensure that competition is 
not distorted by the interventions of the state27. This is why the rules for state aid 
are significant and thus is one of the most essential pillars for the internal 
market: ‘State aid control has become an essential pillar of the Single Market, 
ensuring that companies are able to compete on equal terms independently of 
where they are located and providing safeguards against Member States 
engaging in mutual subsidy races at the expense of each other and of the 
general European interest. Such subsidy races would not only lead to a wasteful 
                                                          
24Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326, 
26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390. 
25See supra note 7. 
26Cameron P.D. (2007).Competition in Energy Markets-Law and Regulation in the European Union. 2nd 
ed, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 262. 
27Jonker, W. & Vedder, H.H.B. (2010).Het Europeesrechtelijk kader voor financiële instrumenten ter 
stimulering van energietransitie. In: Krot, B. & Smorenburg-van Middelkoop, L. (Ed.)Duurzame Energie–
Juridische kansen en belemmeringen.Groningen:Europa Law Publishing, p.39. 
12 
 
12 
 
use of scarce resources, they would be to the detriment of the cohesion of the 
EU’ according to the report for competition policy in 201028. 
Ιn art. 107 (1) TFEU, enumerated the four criteria, which, when fulfilled jointly, 
render a State aid incompatible with the internal market29. First of all, the rules 
that related with state aid control are laid down in articles 107-109 and in art. 
107 (1) TFEU there is the definition of state aid: 
‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market’.30  
Based on the above ruling someone can easily conclude that Article 107 (1) 
TFEU constitutes a negative condition for the arrangements of the Member 
States which grant national aid for certain purposes, such as for example the aid 
granted for the development of renewable energy sources. However, there are 
some exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 107 TFEU, which are applied 
in the second stage of the evaluation of the compatibility of State aid. More 
specifically, after being reviewed the compatibility of State aid on the basis of 
the four criteria that will be discussed further below, and stated in this case that 
the State aid is illegal, then evaluated whether it can be justified by the 
administration on the basis of the exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 
10731. The four criteria characterizing an aid as illegal must cumulatively be 
met32 and will be referred and comprehensively analyzed below: 
2.2.1Αid granted by State or through state resources 
With regard to the first criterion of Article 107 (1) TFEU is meant to say that the 
interpretation is very wide and there were not few times that created confusion 
                                                          
28Report from the Commission–Report on Competition Policy 2010. COM(2011) 328 final, p. 7. 
29Friederiszick H.W. Röller, L. & Verouden, V. (2006).European State Aid Control: an economic 
framework. Berlin: European School of Management and Technology, p.4. 
30Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ,Article 107 (ex Article 
87 TEC) Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0091 - 0092 
31See supra note 29, p. 3. 
32Vademecum Community Rules on State Aid, September 2008, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/vademecum_on_rules_09_2008_en.pdf, pp. 
6-7. 
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to the Courts. The wider concept of aid was found in the case Banco Exterior de 
Espana in 199433 by the Court of First Instance:  
‘…the concept of aid is thus wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces 
not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally 
included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being 
subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have 
the same effect.’ 
A few years later, and specifically in 2000, in the case Landbroke Racing Ltd,34 
the Court found that even the support to a firm by a local or regional authority 
may belong to the first criterion of Article 107 (1) TFEU and could be considered 
as unlawful State aid. A determinant role in this case played the fact that the 
local or regional communities are part of the state budget and therefore control 
largely the origin source of money35, so it is no coincidence that many times the 
schemes for the support of renewable energy sources was illegally under this 
criterion. However station in the interpretation of state resources was the ruling 
of PreussenElektra, which is not only important for the law of state aid but also a 
milestone for renewable energy and the national support schemes.  
2.2.2. Economic Advantage 
As far as the second criterion is concerned, the economic advantage related 
with the condition, in which a recipient undertaking receives an economic 
advantage from the state, that will not receive in case of normal business36.It is 
very interesting to see how the case law addresses the condition of economic 
advantage. First of all, an undertaking has to be the recipient of the advantage 
‘any natural or legal person, regardless of legal status and means by which it is 
financed, who carries out economic activities of certain regularity and duration 
and which could be done for remuneration’37. In Altmark case the ECJ put 
forward according to economic advantage: ‘Measures which, whatever their 
form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings […] or are to 
                                                          
33CaseC-387/92Banco Exterior de España SA v. Ayuntamiento de Valencia[1994] ECR I-877. 
34Case C-83/98French Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd and Commission of the European Communities 
[2000] ECR I-3271. 
35See supra note 27, p. 42 
36Haucap, J., & Schwalbe, U. (2011). Economic Principles of State Aid Control. Düsseldorf Institute for 
Competition Economics. Discussion Paper No. 17,p.2. 
37Nicolaides, P., Buykes, P. & Kekelekis, M. (2005). State Aid Policy in the European Community: 
Principles and Practise. 2nd ed., Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 25. 
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be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would 
not have obtained under normal market conditions […] are regarded as aid’38. 
Although, in the same case, which is a landmark case for the sector of the 
Public Service Obligations, the economic advantage constitutes an exception in 
the services of general economic interest39.Moreover, the economic advantage 
is absent when the intervention of the state has got a private character and for 
this reason it is important to be applied the private investor test by the 
Commission. So, if it is concluded, that the intervention of the state has the 
character of a private investor40, the measure is not faced like an economic 
advantage. 
2.2.3. Selectivity 
According to the criterion of selectivity, the intervention of the state must benefit 
some undertakings or the production of certain goods more than others41 but if 
the measure is in general benefits all the undertakings of a Member State 
without distinction, then there is not illegality according to the state aid rules42. 
Excluding the general measures of the State from the state aid rules of art. 107 
(1) TFEU, there is a strong possibility to create uncertainty, as in the case of 
Adria Wien in 2001 with the tax exemption on electricity taxes for the producers 
but not the suppliers. In its ruling the ECJ recognized that a measure can be 
justified if it concerns a general scheme but in the case of Adria Wien Pipeline 
this exemption did not apply and the rules of state aid was taken place43. 
Another case with environmental context is the case British Aggregates 
Association (2008)44, in which according to the ruling of European General 
Court, a measure with environmental objective is not sufficient to justify a 
selective measure applied by the State because the main purpose of the art. 
107(1) TFEU is the effects of a measure and not the specific goal of the 
measure45. 
                                                          
38Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans Gmbh v. Nahverkehrsgellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-1774. 
39See supra note 27, p.43. 
40See supra note 36,p.2. 
41Case C-143/99Adria-WienPipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2001] ECRI-08365. 
42See supra note 36,p.2. 
43Case C-143/99Adria-WienPipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2001] ECR I-08365, par. 42 
44Case C-487/06 P. British Aggregates Association v Commission of the European Communities and 
United Kingdom [2008] ECR I-10515. 
45See supra note 44,par.3. 
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2.2.4. Effect on trade and competition 
Last but not least, is the analysis of the last two criteria, which are inseparable 
linked as a general rule46.So, the main effect of an illegal aid is the effect on the 
trade and the distortion of the competition. In the Philip Morris case the ECJ 
held: ‘when state financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking 
compared with other undertakings competing in intra-community trade the latter 
must be regarded as affected by that aid’47. The distortion of the competition is 
difficult to be proved, so it is sufficient to be shown if the measure actually 
threatens the distortion of competition. The last indication for state aid is that 
when this aid affects the trade between two or more Member States and this is 
what exactly the Commission must prove, regardless of the amount of the aid or 
the size of the recipient. So, when the beneficiary undertaking is a part of an 
existing and active market, where other member states and companies are 
brought into action, then the last criterion is met48. Therefore in relation to the 
national support schemes for green electricity, these fall in the above case, 
because of the integration of the electricity market.49 
2.3. The exceptions of art.107 para. 2 & 3 TFEU 
After the analysis of the four criteria set out above, we conclude that if these 
criteria are met cumulatively then the aid shall be deemed illegal according with 
the article 107 (1) TFEU. However, ‘the principle of incompatibility does not 
amount to a full scale-scale prohibition’50  and this leads us precisely to the 
implementation of the second stage of the examination of state aid, which 
concerns the exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of art.107 TFEU. The exceptions 
that referred to paragraph two are related with aid of social content, aid to 
compensate damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, 
aid to compensate Germany for the economic disadvantage caused by the 
division of the country and they are compatible with the internal market besides 
the first evaluation as illegal51. Furthermore, the same comes about with the 
provisions of article 107(3) TFEU and so the aid may be considered to be 
compatible with the internal market. As far as, the national support schemes for 
                                                          
46Case C-241/94,FrancevCommission[1996] ECR I-4551, par.37. 
47Case C-730/90 Phillip Morris Holland v. Commission [1980] ECR 2671., par. 11. 
48Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans Gmbh v. Nahverkehrsgellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-1774., 
par. 78 
49See supra note 27, p.42. 
50Vademecum Community Rules on State Aid, September 2008, p.7. 
51 Heidenhain Martin (2010). European State Aid Law. Oxford: Hard Publishing, pp.143-151. 
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the promotion of the renewable energy are concerned, the Commission with a 
broad discretion power52 publishes ‘communications’, ‘frameworks, and 
‘guidelines’, in order to provide to Member States a specified approach 
according to main objectives. For the support of RES-E there are two 
instruments: ‘Community Guidelines on State Aid and Environmental Protection’ 
(Environmental Guidelines)53 and the ‘General Block Exemptions Regulation’ 
(GBER)54. According to the Environmental Guidelines, there will be a further 
analysis in the last chapter, because it is important for the approximation of the 
questions raised in this thesis, but first in the next chapter.  
 
CHAPTER III. Feed-in tariffs and the approach of the 
European case law 
 
Continuing, before the analysis of the case law about the FIT support schemes and 
their compatibility with the State Aid rules, will be referred nominally the different 
categories of national support schemes and will be given the definition of the most 
important instrument which is the feed-in tariffs. 
 
3.1. The definition of FIT support schemes 
As mentioned, neither the Directive 2001 nor Directive 2009 clearly outlined 
what support measures have to be taken in each Member for the promotion of 
renewable energy sources (see in chapter one the reference of art. 2 of the RED 
2009). So, the Member States have to select the instruments for RES-E 
promotion which are55: Feed-in tariff (FIT), Feed-in premium system (Premium), 
Quota obligation, Investment grants, Tax incentives or exemptions, Fiscal 
incentives. Feed-in tariffs is one of the most important support mechanism (23 
                                                          
52See supra note 27, p.46. 
53Community Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection, OJ 2008 C-82/01. 
54Commission Regulation (EC) NO 800/2008 of 6 august 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption regulation). OJ 2008 L-214. 
55Haas, R. (2011).A historical review of promotion strategies for electricity from renewable energy 
sources in EU countries. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, [online], Vol. 15(2011), pp. 
1003-1017. 
17 
 
17 
 
Member States use FIT schemes56) for the promotion of the renewable energy 
and its definition is: ‘FIT schemes are regulated prices for RES-E fed into the 
grid, set by law for a certain period of time, and typically set higher than the 
achievable market prices’57 and the purpose of the scheme is to ensure a profit 
for the RES-E producers. Let's move on the analysis of PreussenElektra, one of 
the most important decisions dealt with a FIT plan and a landmark case of their 
design by public authorities, not only for FIT schemes but also for other support 
schemes for green electricity. It is important to be said that emphasis will be 
given to the analysis of two important decisions concerning FIT projects, like the 
analysis of PreussenElektra in comparison with the more recent case Vent de 
Colère, with the purpose to become apparent whether the case law developed 
according to the FIT schemes in relation with art.107(1)TFEU but there are and 
other important cases which based on PreussenElektra that can’t be analyzed in 
the context of this thesis. 
3.2. PreussenElektra case 
First of all, as far as the background of the case, this related with a German FIT 
law which purposed to promote the RES-E production in Germany. According to 
the above law the distribution undertakings were obliged to purchase RES-E 
which produced in their area at minimum prices and by this way provided a 
compensation mechanism58. The dispute is between PreussenElektra which is a 
conventional electricity producer and a Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
and Schleswag which as a DSO, obliged to purchase electricity from renewable 
energy at minimum prices. As regards this minimum price, its calculation based 
on the average nationwide sales price for electricity but differentiated for RES 
because of the technology used by the producers and so the price paid by DSO 
for RES was higher than its real economic value. The dispute was created 
because PreussenElektra besides the fact that as TSO obliged to pay the 
additional costs to the Schleswag, according to a hardship clause contained to 
the FIT scheme, refused to fulfill this requirement. It is significant to be 
mentioned that PreussenElektra had got the majority of shareholding in 
                                                          
56Poullikkas A., Kourtis G., Hadjipaschalis I. (2012). An overview of the EU Member States support 
schemes for the promotion of renewable energy sources. International Journal of Energy & 
Environment, [online], Vol. 3(4), pp 8-9. 
57Madlener, R., & Stagl, S. (2005). Sustainability-guided promotion of renewable electricity generation.  
Ecological Economics, [online] Vol. 5(1), pp.152. 
58Case 379/98 PreussenElektra par. 6-7, 9. 
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Schleswag and the remaining part was under control by municipal authorities59. 
Examining this dispute, the primary issue raised, was if the purchasing 
obligation and the compensation mechanism was an illegal state aid according 
to the art.107 (1) TFEU. Another subject was the compatibility of this law with 
the principle of the free movement of goods art. 34 TFEU that will be not 
analyzed in this dissertation but its junction with the subject is important for the 
formulation of the conclusions. 
According to the ECJ the measure was not transferred an economic advantage 
to the RES producers, “since it guarantees them, with no risk, higher profits than 
they would make in its absence”60.Furthermore, the question if the measure 
distorted competition and affected the trade between Member-States, wasn’t 
examined by the ECJ. So, the criterion of the art. 107 (1) TFEU “granted by a 
Member State or through State resources”, will be the fundamental question that 
have to be answered in relation with this dispute and hence the constitutive 
issue of the notion of state aid61. The ECJ, firstly, issued that according with its 
case law only the advantages that granted directly or indirectly through State 
resources are regarded as aid and at the same time rejected the argument in 
which “aid granted through State resources” related with measures that financed 
through public funds and “aid granted by a Member State”, related with all the 
other measures that not be financed through state resources.62 The ECJ stated 
that the above distinction did not: 
    [S]ignify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through 
State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within 
that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and 
those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the 
State.63  
This statement extensively referred to other cases like Sloman Neptun, Van 
Tigelle, Ecotrade and Piaggion64. The Commission and PreussenElektra held 
that in instant case the measure obliged the competitors to transfer money 
                                                          
59Kuhn T. (2001). Implications of the 'Preussen Elektra'-judgement of the European Court of Justice on 
the Community rules on State aid and the free movement of goods Preliminary Ruling of 13 March 
2001, Case C-379/98, Preussen Elektra v. Schleswag.  Legal Issues of Economic Integration,[online], 
Vol.28(3),  pp. 361–362. 
60See supra note 58, par. 54. 
61Ag’s opinion in PreussenElektra case, par.112. 
62See supra note 61, par. 153. 
63See supra note 58, par. 58. 
64See supra note 58, par.57. 
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directly to the RES producers.65The Commission concentrated to the cases 
Ecotrade and Piaggion and to other data in order to classify the German FIT 
scheme as an illegal aid, stated that the German State didn’t make the 
difference if the measure will be financed by public or private undertakings and 
this is a problem because the German public authorities hold the majority of the 
capital of the plurality of the firms that activated both as conventional electricity 
producers and TSOs as well as DSOs. The considerations of the ECJ about this 
argument will be seen below. 
Continuing, according to the ECJ the purchase obligation didn’t involve any 
direct or indirect transfer of state resources to the producers of electricity from 
renewable energy. Therefore, there is no transfer of state resources in the case 
of the allotment of the financing burden derived from the purchase obligation for 
the Distribution System Operator and allocated between them and other private 
firms66, so the Court concluded that: “the purchase obligation is imposed by 
statute and confers an undeniable advantage on certain undertakings” was not 
characterized as an illegal state aid. This, however, generating high interest is 
that the Court, did not forward to the analysis, whether the support plan conveys 
resources and whether these resources come from state resources67. In this 
case the fixed minimum price compared with the lower market value, indeed 
transferred resources (giving to the electricity producers of renewable energy an 
advantage in comparison with the producers of fossil fuels), but it isn’t 
determined by the Court whether those resources constitute actually state 
resource or not68. But the view of the AG in this case was69 : 
     ….No public authority enjoys at any moment any rights with regard to 
those sums. In fact they never leave the private sphere. 
This statement was the reply on the Commission’s argument that the support 
scheme helps the conversion of the private resources to state resources70. More 
specifically, according to the above argument the payment of the TSO’s to the 
DSO’s without a quid pro quo, creates parafiscal charges (which are used to 
finance the aid measures). This argument can be compared with the effects of 
the taxation system, where the resources derived from the private sector 
                                                          
65See supra note 61, par. 149. 
66See supra note 58, par. 59-61. 
67See supra note 58, par. 59 and Ag’s opinion par.112, 115,116,121,125. 
68Heidenhain Martin (2010). European State Aid Law. Oxford:Hard Publishing, page 39 and AG’s 
opinion par.121-133,160. 
69AG’s opinion in PreussenElektra case, par.166. 
70See supra note 69, par.163. 
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entrusted for a public interest purpose and undoubtedly was the most powerful 
argument for the characterization of the measure as state aid71.The main 
component is if the state exercised control to the resources according to the 
AG’s view, but the resources in this scheme canalized to a public interest 
purpose without the intervention of the state except the adoption of the 
legislation. So, the ECJ (in par. 56), continuing, failed to examine whether the 
measure financed wholly or partially by the state, giving an indulgent approach 
about the RES-E scheme of the case. But the foundation of AG on this case 
gives a contradictory explanation in which initially the fact that two of the eight 
undertakings that participating in the scheme are controlled by the state, cannot 
justify that the state finance the undertakings which are subject to aid72. 
Besides, the fact that in the instant case there are not involved publicly owned 
undertakings, doesn’t prove that the FIT scheme partially financed from the 
state73. As concluded, the AG’s foundation indicates that the ECJ with this 
lenient approach created an uncertainty in the design of FIT schemes. 
Last but not least, the ECJ examines two more arguments for classifying the 
scheme as state aid74. According to the first argument, the scheme because of 
the compensation and purchase obligation affected not only the undertakings 
but also the state with a loss in the tax revenue75. Under the second argument, 
the art. 107-108 TFEU in order to be effective have to interpret the state aid so 
as to comprise measures which have coequal effect and to this purpose the 
Commission invoked the art. 101 TFEU. About this argument, which read in 
conjunction with article 4[3] para.2 & 3 TEU, the ECJ referred that the art. 101 
TFEU related only with the conduct of the undertakings and not with the 
measures decided by the Member States and the art. 4 [3] shouldn’t be used in 
this case because it doesn’t fall within the art. 107 TFEU76.  
The ECJ, in the light of the above considerations concluded that the FIT scheme 
with the compensation and purchase obligation that conclude, couldn’t be 
characterized as state aid. 
3.2.1. The assessment of the judgment 
                                                          
71See supra note 69, same paragraph. 
72See supra note 69, par. 175-177. 
73Case 379/98 PreussenElektra par. 60. 
74See supra note 69, par. 185-189. 
75Case 379/98 PreussenElektra par. 62. 
76See supra note 75, par. 64-66. 
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Before proceeding with the analysis of the subsequent decision and the 
comparison between the two decisions its necessary to be referred some basic 
conclusions of the judgment. In case of PreussenElektra the ECJ omitted to 
analyze whether the transferred resources constitute state aid and concluded 
that as far as the state or the public authorities are not involved in the managing 
of the advantages and the economic burden between the private undertakings, 
then the support scheme is not amount to state aid. In this way the judgment 
besides this omission, neglected to deal with the broader meaning of the art. 
107 (1) TFEU like the case of the control of the state in private funds77 and so 
this approach was easy to create a legal uncertainty in the designation of FIT 
schemes.  
 3.3. Vent de Colère case 
As far as the background of the case is concerned, on December 2013 the 
European Court of Justice have concerned with the case Vent de Colère. 
According to this decision the Court followed the opinion of the Advocate 
General and eventually found that the production of electricity from wind 
installations incorporating an intervention of the State and can be classed as 
state aid according to Article 107 TFEU78. Attention mainly was given to the first 
indication of Article 107 (1) TFEU, i.e. if the support plan of the French State and 
its intervention were an unlawful State aid, besides the considerations of France 
that  the scheme was based on this of PreussenElektra and therefore it doesn’t  
meet the first criterion of Article 107 (1)TFEU79. The ECJ therefore once again 
judged the case on the basis of the ruling of PreussenElektra and focused on 
the economic impact that measures had. 
To begin with, the measure concerns a French FIT scheme in which there is a 
purchase obligation of renewable energy produced by wind power at prices 
higher than the price of the market for electricity. The DSO’s are the 
undertakings (that connected with the wind power installations) which are 
charged with this obligation. There are similarities with PreussenElektra but in 
this case the calculation of the price is made not by the law but from the French 
Minister for Economy and Minister for Energy in collaboration with French 
                                                          
77L. Hancher, T. Ottervanger and P.J. Slot (2012), EU State Aids, 4th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, p 
61. 
78Opinion of the Advocate General Jaaskiner on 11 luly 2013. 
79Salomé C. and Rat D. (2014). Beyond Preussen-Elektra? - EU State Aid and the Promotion of 
Renewable Energy. European Networks Law & Regulation Quarterly, [online] Vol. 2(3), p. 254. 
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Energy Regulator and the Higher Council of Energy80. The mechanism  provided 
to the distributors the opportunity to be compensated for the above additional 
costs, derived from the purchase obligation, was named  Caisse des Depots 
“CDC” (a public group of general interest) and the compensation obligation 
passed to the final consumers (in the case of non-compliance there is an 
administrative penalty81).  
The main legal question here is if the offsetting mechanism i.e. the procedure for 
the financing compensation to the distributors for the additional costs which are 
obliged to pay in higher price for the purchasing of electricity produced by 
wind82, is legal according to the art.107 (1)TFEU. The national court having 
found that there are met the three of the four conditions83 for the 
characterization of the scheme as State aid84 and subsequently requested 
preliminary to the ECJ to examine if the aid granted by the State or through 
state resources. The latter Court identified that when a measure is assignable to 
the State and be granted indirectly or directly through state resources85 is state 
aid and the above offset was clearly amounted to the first criterion. More 
specifically, the offsetting mechanism was attributable to the State because was 
established by law (Law 2000-108). Continuing the funds for the compensation 
for the DSO’s was collected by the final consumers, which are obliged to pay for 
this offsetting mechanisms because of the administrative retributions, trusted to 
the CDC as an intermediary. Moreover, there was the possibility for the 
purchasing obligation to be covered by the State if the collected charges was 
inadequate to cover the additional costs. So, it should be noted that when a 
private or public body found from the state to manage the granted aid then the 
aid is illegal (this criterion analyzed and in the case Italy v Commission86). 
Moreover, the ECJ concluded that the management of the charges from the 
CDC was the main reason to characterize the CDC as an intermediary which 
was under the state control. 
Therefore, the ECJ distinguished the above case from the PreussenElektra, 
where pointed that the private undertakings weren’t under the control of the 
                                                          
80See supra note 79, p. 254. 
81See supra note 79, p.254. 
82The obligation to purchase the energy produced using windpower was established by law  No 2000-
108 (Articles 5 and 10) 
83Case C 216/12 Vent de Colère, par. 9, 15. 
84Decision No 124852 of 15 May 2012. 
85See supra note 83, par.16. 
86Case 173/73 Italy v Commission, par.16. 
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state and the purchase obligation was accomplished via their own state 
resources and hence the ECJ illustrated the issues that didn’t analyze namely 
the funds in PreussenElektra couldn’t be regarded as state resources because 
they were not under state control. So, the ECJ validates the PreussenElektra in 
this case but according with the AG’s point of view there are and other means 
that could be used in order to distinguish the above cases87.The primary factor 
distinguishing the Vent de Colère from the mechanism examined by the Court in 
PreussenElektra,   
“is that the burden of financing the obligation to purchase electricity from wind 
power at a price higher than the market price applies to all consumers of 
electricity in France, irrespective of whether they purchase green energy or 
not, knowing that, in the liberalised electricity market, the achievement of 
which is one of the primary objectives of the Union, exists competition 
between the producers and the suppliers of energy. While conceding that, 
physically, electricity from different sources is mixed together in the 
distribution network, I note that, with regard to the mechanism in issue in the 
main proceedings, it is impossible for the suppliers to differentiate, for tariff 
purposes, between the different categories of consumers, and that it is 
impossible for consumers to opt for or against purchasing renewable energy.” 
There are some comments that arising from the abovementioned opinion. 
Firstly, that the AG concentrated on a different policy reason that is far from the 
question if the funds are amount to state resources and secondly the fact that 
the consumers didn’t have the opportunity to choose if they want to purchase 
renewable energy or not, is a financial burden with additional costs equivalent to 
state aid88. 
3.3.1. The assessment of the judgment 
As regards the results obtained after the analysis of the above case, is obvious 
that the European Court of Justice didn’t made any step forward because it only 
had declared that any intervention of the State which is not identical to the 
PreussenElektra is an illegal state aid89 and upheld once again the ruling of 
PreussenElektra, enhancing the favorable regime was set up from this. However 
                                                          
87AG’s opinion in Case Vent de Colère par. 50-51 
88Salomé C. and Rat D. (2014). Beyond Preussen-Elektra? - EU State Aid and the Promotion of 
Renewable Energy. European Networks Law & Regulation Quarterly, [online], Vol. 2(3), p. 256. 
89See supra note 88, p. 258. 
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the decision of the Court was not particularly surprising as the RES-E support 
scheme was a flagrant violation of the French State, because it didn’t notify the 
support plan on the Commission, relying on the favorable but unclear yet 
scheme drawn up by PreussenElektra.  
3.4. The observations arising 
As mentioned above, the decision of PreussenElektra created a dogmatic issue 
on the law of state aid, which subsequently proved to be insufficient and 
uncertain as far as the state intervention in the design of national support 
mechanisms for renewable energy sources, is concerned. Besides the 
ambiguity of the above ruling, the Court after a decade and a host of cases 
struggles to patronize its effects and this is proven and in case Vent de Colère90, 
because these two jurisdictions are compiled. First of all it is important to 
remember that a support scheme should be assessed in detail and case-by-
case whether eventually it is an unlawful State aid or not, but theoretically, there 
are some limits emerged from PreussenElektra for the adoption of a FIT scheme 
in order to be legal and not fulfill the conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU, which 
also are vague. Combining the purchase obligation and the minimum prices with 
the ability to pass on the cost to the final consumers but not in the way the 
French state did, it is feasible for the FIT plan to escape from the prohibition of 
art. 107(1) TFEU and hence to be considered as lawful (this occasion will be 
analyzed below [footnote 96]). This practice cannot be applied and have been 
abandoned the last few years, because most of the Member States are 
organizing the compensation mechanism of their support schemes91, as this is a 
difficult process for a private undertaking to manage these resources without the 
order and the intervention of the state. In the case of Vent de Colère, this was 
exactly happened when the established by the State entity functioned as an 
intermediary, managed the additional costs and this was clearly constituted 
state aid, even if it didn’t based directly on state resources. As mentioned 
above, an intermediary was designated in order to congregate and manage the 
additional costs, but in this situation (even if the intermediary was not a public 
body but anyone actor) the main purpose here is that when an actor designated 
for the administration of the funds of the scheme by law or a 
                                                          
90Giraud A. (2014). Vents De ColÃ¨re! — Testing the Limits of PreussenElektra. European State Aid 
Law Quarterly, [online],Vol. 13(2), p 1-2. 
91Ringel M. (2006). Fostering the use of renewable energies in the European Union: the race between 
feed-in tariffs and green certificates.  Renewable Energy, [online] Vol.31( 1), page 6-8. 
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public/governmental decision, then the design is amount to state aid, since it will 
be considered that the state possibly exercise control on the resources92.At the 
same time, the occasion in which an offset mechanism constituted by market 
operators, with the aim to administer these resources voluntarily is extremely 
difficult to be done and so, it is important to be said that these instructions are 
misleading for the Member States besides the fact that it was happen in the 
case of PreussenElektra93. Therefore, the conclusion is that the French State 
seeking to imitate the support mechanism for renewable energy sources, 
considering that meet the conditions presented in the case of PreussenElektra, 
herded in flagrant violation of Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
The persistence of the ECJ in a regressive approach about the FIT schemes94, 
in relation with the freedom of Member States about the selection of their 
national RES-E support scheme, created a lot of problems in the integration of 
the single market and the harmonization of the FIT schemes95 and the other 
support schemes in general with a common framework. But how the ruling of 
PreussenElektra comes into conflict with the common framework of national 
support schemes and hence the integration of the single market and its proper 
operation? The first observation related with the creation of a partial overlaying 
of the national regulations for the formation of their support schemes by the 
rules of state aid96. It is easy to be noticed that initially appears to be a 
classification between the State interventions in the designation of  a FIT 
support scheme and on the one hand is the system of  PreussenElektra which if  
adopted by a Member State for the accretion of a FIT scheme will avoid the 
state aid control97,  and on the other hand are the cases like Vent de Colère with 
other similar cases (like the Essent98, yet the new German law for the renewable 
energy, EEG 201299), in which the issue of the existence of an intermediary 
designed by a Member State for the management of the flow of the money 
                                                          
92Case C 216/12 Vent de Colère. 
93See supra note 88, p.258. 
94See supra note 90, pp. 1-2. 
95Egenhorfer, C., & Jansen, C.J. (2006).A timetable for harmonisation of support schemes for renewable 
electricity in the EU.  European Review of Energy Markets, [online] Vol. 1(2), pp. 18-21. 
96Rusche T. M. (2015). EU Renewable Electricity Law and Policy: From National Targets to a Common 
Market. Cambridge Univerity Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 103-106. 
97Koenig C., Kühling J. (2002). EC control of aid granted through State resources: Public undertakings, 
Funds, Imputability and the importance of how resources are transferred.  European State Aid Law 
Quarterly, [online], Vol. 1(1), pp 17-18. 
98C-206/06 - Essent Netwerk Noord and Others 
99The General Court confirms that the German law on renewable energy of 2012 (the EEG 2012) 
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constitutes an illegal state aid and are undergone in the state aid control. But as 
has been advocated above the ruling of PreussenElektra, besides the absence 
of an intermediary, accompanied by a legal uncertainty and a lot of omissions, 
so this is why most of the Member States that have followed this ruling believed 
that they didn’t grant State Aid and didn’t notify their national support schemes 
to the Commission (like the Italy, Poland, Greece100), in order to be controlled 
whether they constitute state aid or not. So, the main problem as far as the first 
observation is concerned, is that the application of FIT schemes without prior 
notification to the Commission because they designated in relation to the ruling 
of PreussenElektra and considered as legal, are responsible for the distortions 
of the internal market, disrupting its proper operation. Furthermore, the second 
observation related with the problems derived from the existing legislation 
concerning the support of renewable energy (there is an analysis in the first 
chapter of this thesis) in conjunction with PreussenElektra. As is apparent from 
both RES Directives 2001/77/EC and 2009/28/EC, these are aimed at 
strengthening the RES-E growth at national level, where the Member States 
organize their own support scheme on the basis of their diversity (it is "vital that 
member States can control the effect and the costs of the national support 
schemes according to their different potentials", as pointed in the Recital 25 of 
the Directive 2009/28/EC). In the same Directive achieving the objective to 
promote cross-border trade is simply a long-term goal, which also proves that it 
strives only for the success of the support schemes at national level and cross-
border trade and cooperation between the Member States come in second 
place101. But the problem does not stop here, as the same way adopted also 
and in superior rules such as the Article 194 para. 2 TFEU, where introduced 
the three basic energy rights of  Member States “a Member State's right to 
determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without 
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).”102 All the above enhanced the state discretion103 
in the process of the selection of the national support schemes which already, 
because of their different categories, created problems in the harmonization of 
the national regulatory systems for the RES-E promotion. Furthermore, in the 
                                                          
100See supra note 96, pp. 116-118. 
101Bergman, J., Behlau, V., Jensen, S.G., Held, A., Pfluger, B., Ragwitz, M., Resch, G. (2008). 
Harmonisation of suppor schemes-a European harmonised policy to promote RES-eletricity– sharings 
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102Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 194 ,Official 
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103Forowich Magdalena (2011), State Discretion as a paradox of EU evolution, EUI Working Papers, 
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enhancement of state discretion, contributes and the PreussenElektra with its 
“limp” limits and its omissions according to the main issue of “through state 
resources”, because it doesn’t offer a clear indication for the correct design of a 
FIT scheme and this is why most of the Member States create support schemes 
that are different between them and mainly illegal according to art.107(1) TFEU, 
something that didn’t happen if they based not in their decision practice(state 
discretion) for the creation of a legal framework of a FIT scheme but in a 
common framework for the FIT schemes in order to be lawful. As a result, the 
state discretion which enhanced not only by the freedom given the Member 
States from the Directives to choose their own support scheme, but also from 
the lenient approach of the PreussenElektra, create difficulties in the context of 
the internal market. Lastly a third observation is that the national support 
schemes for the renewable energy related also with the art. 34-36 TFEU about 
the free movement of goods, a basic principle which disregards not only in 
PreussenElektra ( “it must first be borne in mind that, according to the case-law 
of the Court, Article 30 of the Treaty, in prohibiting all measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports, covers any national 
measure which is capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade”, “It should be noted that that policy is also 
designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants”104) but 
also in the last judgments of ECJ which invoked the PreussenElektra like the 
Alands Vindkraft105 and Essent106, where once again overemphasized the 
national character of the support schemes.  
CHAPTER IV. Is there any solution? 
 
In the last chapter there will be an analysis of the new Guidelines in order to be 
concluded if they could be considered as the solution in the above problem of legal 
uncertainty according to RES-E FIT schemes, created by PreussenElektra. 
 
                                                          
104Case PreussenElektra, par. 76-79 
105C-573/12 - Ålands Vindkraft. 
106C-206/06 - Essent Netwerk Noord and Others. 
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4.1. The new Guidelines as a proposed solution 
On May 2012, the European Commission adopted a Communication in State 
Aid modernization and announced an inclusive reform program concerning 
State aid control where attempting for the first time to provide guidance on all 
aspects concerning the interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU107.The most 
fundamental change was the modernization of the guidelines, relating to the  art. 
107 para. (3)TFEU, which had in common the identical approach of the complex 
issue of the assessment of the compatibility with the internal market108. The new 
guidelines for the environmental and energy state aid are the main issue of this 
chapter. First of all, the notion of aid interpreted mainly by the European 
Commission, when listing the types of aid that may be deemed to be compatible 
with internal market and this is why enjoys of a wide discretion109. European 
Commission with its soft law, was trying hardly to offer guidance according to 
the compatibility of state aids with the internal market. The previous guidelines 
of 2001 and 2008 considered the compatibility of State aid with the internal 
market pursuant to the exceptions of paragraph 3(c) of Article 107 TFEU110-111 
and there were two steps of evaluation: firstly the granted aid had to be well 
defined in order to be subject to the common interest and secondly included the 
criteria of a RES-E support scheme that considered as an operating aid112. 
Unlike with the previous EAG of 2008 which are not sufficiently clear and 
primarily was quite elastic as to the compatibility of support schemes with the 
internal market, the new Guidelines for the term 2014-2020 bring more strict 
criteria on the compatibility of State aids which granted in the energy and 
environmental sectors and set out the conditions under which State aid in the 
field of energy can be declared compatible with the EU internal market on the 
basis of Article 107(3) TFEU113. The main core of the above guidelines are the 
limits designated for the organization of the national support schemes, the 
                                                          
107Bucci V. (2014).The modernisation of state aid control and its objectives:clarity, relevance, 
effectiveness, Journal of Italian Antitrust Review, [online] Vol.3 (2014), pp 7-23. 
108See supra 107, pp. 8-9. 
109Metaxas A./Makri Pan.,2014. Case T-150/2012 - or - in a nutshell: What not to invoke in State Aid 
Cases - Annotation on the Judgement of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 9th of April 2014 in 
Case T-150/12 Greece v Commission, European State Aid Law Quarterly,[online] Vol.4, pp 744. 
110Blauberger M. (2004).From Negative to Positive Integration?European State Aid Control Through Soft 
and Hard Law,MPIfG Discussion Paper 08/4. 
111Maca V. (2009). New Guidelines of the EU Commission on Environmental State Aid: Who Will Gain 
and Who Will Lose? Common Law Review, [online], Vol. 11(1), pp 20-23. 
112See EAG 2008, point 20. 
113See surpa note 111, p23. 
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common principles that the Commission will apply in the assessment of the 
granted aids and the enhancement of art. 108 TFEU because all support 
schemes for the energy sector must to be notified to the Commission for 
approval114. Continuing, another important issue is that from the 1st January of 
this year (2016) the aids will be given as premium in addition to the price market 
and this is a crucial issue because the feed-in tariffs will be replaced by the 
feed-in premiums and phased out and only the small installations will continue to 
be supported by feed-in tariffs115. Moreover, after the transitional phase that 
lasts until the end of this year, from the 1st January of 2017 all aids have to be 
granted through a bidding process and this is means that the FIP mechanism 
will be required for that purpose116. There are also  exceptions from this 
proceeding that are related mainly with the small installations and a lot of details 
about the national support schemes that  will be not further analyzed in this 
section. So, the new Guidelines not only identify the weaknesses of the earlier 
Guidelines117 and case law (arising by PreussenElektra) around the FIT projects 
but also restrict their application and strengthens the harmonization of the 
support schemes (positive integration) limited by territorial restrictions put 
forward by the Directives and the art. 194 (2) TFEU, trying to promote certainty 
and better guidance for the future promotion of green electricity with respect to 
the primary rules of the state aid. In conclusion the Member States will have an 
increased responsibility for the orderly operation of the internal market and for 
maintaining the conditions of a healthy competition, as well there will be more 
control with the prior notification. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the ruling of PreussenElektra about the German FIT scheme is 
the incentive to ascertain that there is legal uncertainty and no cohesion in the 
configuration of national RES-E schemes not only among the different 
categories of support schemes but also within the same category of the FIT 
schemes. But the deceptive concept of “through state recources” which wasn’t 
analyzed in PreussenElektra continues to create a lot of problems.  It is not 
surprising that until the last years, most of the states based on this judgment 
keep on designing FIT’s without notifying them to the European Commission, 
                                                          
114See supra note 107, p. 20. 
115See EEAG 2014-2020, point 124. 
116See supra note 115, point 126. 
117See EEAG 2014-2020 Consultation Paper, point 57. 
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perpetuating the result and the directions of a decision which is not now in line 
with the stage of the development of the European energy market. Therefore, 
although to a certain extent the approach of the case law of the ECJ could be 
justified from the immaturity of the market in the field of renewable energy and 
from the efforts of the European Union to promote its growth, this favorable 
regime has to be moderated, because it is inconsistent with the primary 
objective of the Union, i.e. the common and harmonized market. So,  the new 
guidelines have established a legal framework which defining the criteria of the 
compatibility of an aid constraining the state discretion and overstating the 
meaning of the internal market, noting once again that the promotion of 
renewable energy in order to stop the climate change can’t disregard the main 
purposes of the European Union. 
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